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Abstract

In this paper, we investigate the working
assumptions and the backgrounds of compliant and
non-compliant employees, making this study one of
the few that touches on the subject of profiling
internal non-malicious volitional security violators.
We uncover four profiles of IT security, each with
different assumptions about ITsec measures. In the
following paragraphs, we give a brief overview of the
literature on IT security before describing the
methodology and the analysis sections. The IT
security literature is extensive, covering such
manifold topics as information sharing among peers
[11], disclosure of vulnerabilities in software [16],
disclosure of security breaches [23], technical
capabilities against outside attacks [2] and technical
capabilities against opportunistic employees [12].
Several published reviews of the ITsec literature
provide comprehensive meta-analyses of technical
and behavioral ITsec research [25], of the deterrence
approach in compliance [8], and of the different
approaches to increase employee compliance to ITsec
policies [1]. Evident in these reviews of the literature
is the assumption implicit in most empirical IT
security research that IT security is de facto “good”,
that the more IT security, the better, and that
motivating employees to comply with IT security is a
highly desirable objective for IT departments. Users
face a plethora of ever-increasing security
requirements that are sometimes viewed as
constraining, demanding, and challenging to
understand or follow [18, 19, 28]. The burden of
security compliance may induce some employees to
circumvent the policies with negative consequences
for organizations [18, 24]. In a survey of thousands of
employees, such explanations as “not-thinking about
policies because of work overload” and “the
inconvenience to follow policies” are reported as the
main reasons for ISP violations [5].
This study seeks to advance our understanding of
the assumptions behind compliant and non-malicious
non-compliant users and the implications of these
assumptions for IT security. In particular, the study
employs a case study to uncover assumptions of
compliant and non-compliant users to ITsec measures

Among the major IT security challenges facing
organizations is non-malicious employee behavior
that nevertheless poses significant threats to an
organization’s IT security. Using a grounded theory
methodology, this paper finds that organizational
security behaviors are inherently related to employee
assumptions regarding the importance of IT security
policy compliance and regarding the reason why IT
security measures are implemented. Analyzing these
assumptions uncovers four profiles of perspectives
concerning IT security: the IT Security Indulgence,
the IT Security Overindulgence, the IT Knows Best
and the IT Security Disconnect profiles. These
profiles are useful in understanding employee IT
security behaviors and may help IT departments in
developing more effective strategies designed to
ensure policy compliance.

1. Introduction and Literature
Background
Employees pose a significant threat to
information technology security (ITsec) in
organizations [4, 28]. Studies indicate that employees
are responsible for over 50% of reported security
breaches [21] and that carelessness or lack of
awareness accounts for nearly 40% of insider security
incidents [29]. To mitigate insider threats,
organizations have invested significant resources in
developing behavioral as well as technical
countermeasures, including policy development,
training programs, and technological security updates
[20] and various industries have advanced standards
regulating organizational IT security measures [4].
Nevertheless, some employees continue to show nonmalicious opportunistic behaviors, circumventing IT
security policies and thereby decreasing IT security
effectiveness. Not all insiders are non-compliant, and
not all non-compliant insiders have the same profiles.
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and, in so doing, create profiles of internal
employees’ perspectives of IT security. Using a
grounded theory methodology, we analyzed data
obtained via interviews of faculty, staff, and
administrators at a large private university in the
southwest United States. Our analysis uncovers two
basic assumptions underlying varying perspectives of
IT security in organizations. Using these two
assumptions, we develop a matrix of IT security
policy perspectives (MSPP). The matrix depicts four
perspectives of IT security policies. These
perspectives are helpful in understanding internal
employee reactions to increased security as well as
their potential to circumvent IT security policies.
Consistent with grounded theory methodology,
we did not enter the field with specific theories in
mind. However, we did undertake a thorough review
of the IT security literature to apprise ourselves of the
theories and constructs widely used in studies of IT
security and policy compliance. It was through our
reading of the IT security literature that we noticed
the dearth of research and theory into understanding
the mindset of compliant vs. non-compliant
professionals in organizations. In the interest of
space, we refer the readers to several review papers
for in-depth coverage of the IT security literature [1,
8, 25]. The remainder of our paper will present our
method, data analysis, and emergent matrix of the
profiles of compliant and non-compliant insiders as
well as the implications of these profiles.

Grounded theory is a methodology that does not
force-fit data to a priori theory; rather, its aim is to
derive theory from data [6]. The building blocks of
the theoretical framework (the matrix) to be
developed in this approach are intimately tied to the
data [9]. Grounded theory has three basic
components: 1) theoretical sampling and site
selection, 2) data collection, and 3) data analysis and
validation [6, 10].

To date, PHEI has never been hacked and,
according to the CISO, is at the forefront of security
implementations. In 2014, double authentication
VPN was implemented so that those users who were
off-campus but who wanted to access specific
systems would not be able to access the network
without a second authentication level (a code sent to
an app on their smartphones). The trend for the
coming years is that PHEI is moving toward making
the majority of the systems inaccessible without a
double-authentication method. Furthermore, PHEI
has begun a project to encrypt voice mails and web
and videoconferences. In recent years, PHEI has also
added additional security including encryption to all
institutionally provided computer devices. Although
private devices are permitted on the premises, the
devices can only access the Internet and no device
can connect to the networks and printers. All
institutionally owned mobile devices are tracked and
remotely accessible by PHEI’s IT department so that
PHEI can wipe any device if stolen or lost. PHEI’s
website contains 43 pages of ITsec policies and
guidelines. This strong emphasis on security policies
makes PHEI a good site to analyze the plethora of
users’ responses to increased IT security.
Data collection consisted of conducting 32 semistructured interviews (30 respondents) across the
research setting. Sixteen IT related staff (4 females
and 12 males) and 14 users (8 females and 6 males)
were interviewed. Sample questions included “How
do security policies enable and constrain your work
practice?”, “In what ways do IT security policies
make you more effective in your role?” and “Are
there ways that you feel the security policies
constrain your work? If so, can you give me an
example?”. Four types of data were collected: 1) the
interview data 2) internal documents on ITsec
policies, 3) Q&A emails exchanged with IT security
specialists, and 4) notes taken during attendance at a
security awareness meeting designed for end users.
We conducted the interviews over a 4-month period
in 2015 and ranged from 17 to 48 minutes with an
average of around 30.

2.1 The Site and Data Collection

2.2 Validation

The data collection site is a southwestern private
higher education institution (PHEI) in the United
States comprising ten colleges and employing
approximately 1,000 staff and faculty. As of the date
of this research, the university had roughly $300
million in operating cash, with total assets around $3
billion. Information security is highly valued by the
university. The position of chief information security
officer (CISO) was created in 2008.

Data validation occurred in two phases. First, we
engaged in source triangulation. We sought input
from directors who are faculty members, directors
who are staff, faculty who are also administrators
(e.g., department heads) and faculty not holding any
administrative role. Some staff members interviewed
were administrators, others were not, some staff in
the Information Technology Services (ITS) were
senior staff members, others were junior in their

2. Methodology
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position. Some ITS staff worked as a bridge between
the IT department and faculty/staff/admins, other ITS
staff worked purely for the IT department. We
triangulated at the strategic, managerial and
operational levels in the organization in order to
establish credibility, enhance the validity of the
results, and avoid skewing the results [7].
In the second phase of the validation, six of the
study’s participants (almost 20% of the total
interviewed) reviewed the findings. It is important to
note that this technique, called member checking, is
the “most critical technique for establishing
credibility” in a grounded theory approach [14, 7].

2.3 Data Analysis
The unit of analysis is the individual, with a
focus on understanding individuals’ perspective of
ITsec policies their behavioral response to the
policies. We used Nvivo 10 software to code the data
in the 3 phases of open, axial, and selective coding
[17] during which we employed constant
comparative analysis to guide the effort. This form of
analysis allows for an evolution of themes, concepts,
and categories from the data collected [22].
Following Charmaz [3], we interacted with the data
to develop codes. Codes were then compared with
data and other codes to develop categories. Concepts
emerged through the process of comparing categories
with other categories and codes. For example, the
“user frustration” category described the following
codes: “painful”, “not fun”, “frustration”, and
“adversarial dance [with IT]”. The inadequate
justification” category included codes like “not
seeing the value yet”, “surprised”, “not
understanding”, “not knowing why” and “having no
idea”. The point of saturation for data collection and
analysis was achieved whenever no new codes
emerged from the data and when identified categories
repeated themselves in the data [10]. At this point, we
grouped the identified categories through axial
coding. The goal of axial coding is to create themes
to represent various related concepts identified in the
transcribed manuscripts. For example, the profile “IT
Security Overindulgence” emerged by several
categories related to each other: “loss of productive
time”, “IT going overboard”, “Not seeing value in
ITsec measure(s)”, and “lack of justification”. Via
selective coding, we related the concepts to each
other to develop the profile matrix. These coding
techniques ultimately resulted in four profiles (Figure
1) and 6 action/reaction outcomes toward ITsec
measures: enforcers, cheerleaders, indifferent,
circumventors, outspoken frustrated, and cautiously
frustrated.

3. Analysis and Discussion
3.1 The Security Assumptions
Via grounded theory, we found two main security
assumptions: a) Assumptions about the reasons for
security (the y-axis of Figure 1) and b) assumptions
about the importance of fully abiding by security
policies (the x-axis of Figure 1).First, we uncovered a
continuum of assumptions on security breach effects
on organizations. Some employees assumed that
security breaches are regular routine phenomena in
this day and age and that any security breach is
unlikely to seriously harm an organization. These
employees think that the IT department feels so
strongly about security not necessarily because the
organization may suffer in the event of a breach, but
because the IT department would be embarrassed.
Employees on the other end of this assumption
spectrum think that security breaches could seriously
harm PHEI. In the security profiles section, we will
give examples that describe these assumptions. The
second assumption, related to the importance of fully
abiding by security policies, ranges from “always
important” to “not always important”. Some
organizational employees perceive that ITsec policies
are important and therefore try to abide by them even
if their productivity is hindered. Other employees do
not perceive the policies as always important and are
inclined to find a way to circumvent them to reduce
hindrances to their productivity.

3.2 The Security Profiles
Figure 1 shows four quadrants resulting from the
two assumptions described above. The IT security
overindulgence quadrant, comprised of both IT staff
and professional users, is skeptical about the enforced
security measures. Individuals in this group assume
that a security breach is unlikely to seriously harm
PHEI and that abiding by the security policies is not
always important. The IT security indulgence
quadrant is comprised of employees who assume that
ITsec measures may only embarrass the IT
department rather than harming the overall
organization but nevertheless feel that it is best to
abide by ITsec measures. The “IT Knows Best”
quadrant assume that the ITsec policies are always
important and that a security breach in the
organization may seriously harm the organization.
Finally, the IT Security Disconnect quadrant is
comprised of individuals who assume that a security
breach could damage the university, but nevertheless
do not consider it important to abide by ITsec
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policies. Instead, they believe that a breach of their
own personal computer or their own ID/password
would not constitute a security breach for PHEI.
We categorized each respondent into a quadrant
based on our analysis of each interview transcript.
We looked for statements that shed light on their
assumptions. We counted ten respondents in the IT
Security Overindulgence quadrant (6 IT staff and 4
professional users); 6 respondents in the IT Security
Indulgence quadrant (all of them users); 10
respondents in the IT Knows Best quadrant (8 IT and
2 users) and 4 respondents in the IT Security
Disconnect quadrant (1 IT and 3 users). These
profiles are explained next.

Figure 1: Matrix of Security Policy Perspectives
(MSPP)

3.3 IT Security Overindulgence
The IT Security Overindulgence profile is
comprised of both professional users and IT
professionals. One might have expected IT
professionals to all be in the IT Knows Best profile,
but that was not the case. The IT professionals fitting
this profile are the IT client services staff who are
serving the professional users including faculty, staff
and administrators in their business and functional
needs. They find software, solutions or applications
in the market to serve the functional needs of
business units. Applications may range from
proctoring software to online teaching solutions like
blackboard or Canvas and a plethora of applications
that enhance teaching, research and administrative
roles in higher educational institutions.

These IT professionals who do not think that IT
knows best and who may feel frustrated with current
ITsec measures are the IT staff who are evaluated
based on their productivity: how many and how fast
they find solutions and how successfully they meet
business needs. We notice that the IT staff of this
group naturally might have a conflict of interest with
the IT security goals: On the one hand, IT security
staff want to minimize security vulnerabilities and
therefore tend to reject the majority of the solutions
suggested by the IT client services but on the other
hand, the IT client services takes pride in the number
of solutions found, suggested and implemented by
them that solve functional problems and expand
opportunities in PHEI (Res 5, 8, 10, 11, 13).
Driving the assumptions of these IT professionals
is their belief that industry standards in the
marketplace are enough. They view security breaches
as routine and mundane (“I use my credit card at
Home Depot. Home Depot had a breach. Okay.
That’s no big deal. You get the credit monitoring.
You go on with life” Res. 8) and feel that the IT
department need not go beyond industry levels,
unnecessarily decreasing the productivity levels of
business units.
One IT project manager whose role is to find
software solutions on the market and make
recommendations for their adoption at PHEI
experienced frustration at a solution being rejected on
security grounds in spite of the fact that “it’s a widely
used system” among universities and “none of them
(the other universities) have any problems with it.”
He felt as if the university was trying to impose
future standards on today’s world: “They’re trying to
get out ahead of it and require what’s going to be
standard in a few years, but why we’re requiring it
now I have no idea…Okay, if it’s (the software)
standard in the industry and everybody’s okay with
that, why are we not? I don’t understand it.”
One IT service staff member expressed some
doubts about the soundness of some of the decisions
made by the IT security review team regarding a
solution he proposed. The following is an excerpt of
his way of not justifying the IT decision:
Some of the reasons I get. Some of the reasons I
understand. Some of the reasons are completely,
totally justified…At the same time, some of the
reason for questioning it is sometimes a little
silly. For example, there was a concern over one
product that we were looking at, a publisher
material, but it would have the ability to write
quiz grades back into the learning management
system. It needed that level of access to write
grades back. A really obscure, unlikely type
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scenario. That obscure, unlikely scenario was
primarily one of the main justifications for saying,
‘No, you can’t do this integration with this
publisher because there’s this off chance that
somebody there might do something unethical
like that [ability to change a grade].’ That seems a
little silly and unlikely, because the it’s a wellknown widely trusted publisher, but that was one
of those scenarios where we didn’t get a chance to
really do that (Senior Academic Consultant).
High activity organizational users and
professionals also are part of this group. These
professionals are evaluated based on productivity,
specifically based on maintaining a high number of
program enrollees (Resp. 25, 29 and 30) and/or a
strong focus on research (Resp. 19 and 28). These are
fast-paced professionals and they may be less tolerant
of security constraints or measures that may impede
or slow their productivity pace than other users who
do not have a high activity level of work
environment.
One administrator who is part of the university’s
internal marketing department wanted to purchase an
analytics system to help in the identification and
analysis of prospective students. Her request was
denied. She listened to the explanations for why the
analytics system should not be used, but still does not
find it justified:
“I took computer science a long time ago. I triple
majored and one of my majors was computer
science. And the company that I used to work at
was a computer company. And so I'm not easily
intimidated by computer speak. And so it's
definitely understandable as far as how they [IT
department] write it [denial of a request] but I'm
not sure it's defensible… It's understandable, it's
not justifiable” (Director of a department).
Many others had similar feelings toward ITsec
measures, aptly summed by one senior faculty
member:
I think at least in my case that the approach they
take to this is over control, you tend to develop
just the impression that they over control because
of the way they handle their security and other
things. And so, then they have this reputation for
over control, and not being there to really serve
you. You’ve got to release a little bit of control.
You should be more concerned with focusing on
the areas that are the biggest threat than focusing
so much on the devices and securing the devices
and stuff like that” (Senior professor).

In summary, the highly active and nonadministrative professionals and users are skeptical
of some of the IT security measures, particularly
when the measures seem to be beyond those
commonly found in other institutions and industries.
For these users, excessive security is viewed as a
hindrance to their productivity (Res. 17, 19, 25, 28,
29 and 30). They are the lifeline of the business units.
Furthermore, their productivity levels are behind the
organizational raison d’etre. They may be inclined to
have a negative attitude to security measures from the
IT department. This group perceives that IT security
staff are enamored with the latest in security
technology and that some security is only undertaken
as much to legitimize the security professionals’ roles
as to benefit the organization.

3.4 IT Security Indulgence
The IT Security Indulgence professionals are the
respondents who are indulging the IT department and
the ITsec measures without feeling strongly for or
against either. They are either ambivalent concerning
ITsec and/or they are problem avoiders who want to
comply in order to stay away with from troubles with
IT or leadership. One of them expressed his opinions
toward ITsec measures by saying:
The way PHEI has set that up [single log-in] is
actually quite efficient so it’s not like we’re
having to keep track of a bunch of different log
ins with a bunch of different passwords. I think
we just assume that they have the appropriate
amount of security to protect the systems that we
have, and if they ask us to change passwords
every three months or every six months or
something, people just do it. (Faculty and chair).
We asked another faculty about her knowledge
and experiences with the Virtual Private Network
(VPN) security guidelines. She responded:
I know that you do have to agree to certain
policies as you begin to use things like a VPN,
but for the most part, that’s fairly standard, so I
don’t have any problems with agreeing to any of
the policies (Faculty)
This group is comprised of non-IT professionals
who either have solely administrative duties (Res 18
and 32) or have fairly routine or low activity levels of
work (Res 2, 24 and 27). They usually do not
question increased ITsec measures and are either
compliant or indifferent to security matters.
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3.5 IT Knows Best
IT Knows Best profile includes IT professionals
who are either in senior IT positions (Resp. 12, 16
and 21) and/or whose job role entails (fully or partly)
the enforcement of security measures (Resp. 21) or
the configuration and/or support of software
implementations (Resp. 9, 14, and 15). These
individuals are evaluated in their jobs partly based on
security implementations. This group has also a
number of users who are generally favorable toward
both the overall ITsec measures and toward new
security implementations.
The IT Knows Best professionals exhibit highly
positive attitudes regarding security measures. One
respondent explained with pride how the IT
department uses a method created by the Department
of Defense to erase all computers prior to recycling
them:
“We’ll bring the computer back, wait for two
weeks to make sure they (the users) have all their
files, and then we use the magnetic storage data
sanitization, the Department of Defense has kind
of a method that uses seven passes to wipe a hard
drive. We wipe it with that. From there the
computers go to pallets to be sold to recyclers.
They have to be certified basically” (Desktop
configuration specialist).
The IT Knows Best professionals were not only
quick to dismiss any inconvenience incurred by users
resulting from PHEI’s security procedures but also
assumed (wrongly, as above-mentioned sections
revealed) that most users understood the necessity of
tight security measures. When asked about the
possible downsides of the mandated encryption on
the institutionally provided laptops, the director of
the repair shop replied:
“It's an inconvenience, but I think most people
probably understand the need for the security.
There is a little bit of delay [in the repair of the
institutionally provided laptops], as I mentioned,
if we're trying to recover data or trying to run
some utilities on the drive, the drive needs to be
unencrypted. But again, I think most people
understand why the security is there. Once we
explain what we have to do, they're pretty
understanding about that.” (Director of hardware
support)
The IT Knows Best professionals are driven by
their belief in the necessity of constant security

improvement and seem to have little awareness of
how the security improvements are received by users.
Their attitude is well summarized by the CISO:
People are like, “That’s inconvenient.” I’m not
saying it’s not inconvenient. I’d never make that
claim. But what I’m saying is that the risk is so
high that we have to take some additional action.
Most of our, what I would say, changes that we
do, absolutely come into place because there’s
evidence to back up why we’re doing this (CISO).
Unlike the skeptical users, these accepting users
do not question the decisions of the IT department
and acquiesce to any policies. An administrative user
who also has a background in federal security
contracting said “ITsec measures at PHEI are not
constraining”. She further expressed her positive
attitude toward the ITsec policies by adding:
There’s an understanding of why they do what
they do, and a thankfulness. I don’t fault them for
the layers they put in place, and I don’t find
they’re without reason. I think that the way they
operate it is quite reasonable, especially for the
amount of knowledge, and security, and
information they store and maintain. When you
think about having to pull transcripts from 15 or
20 years ago, and with the incoming class of
freshman of over 3,000, and multiply that. That in
and of itself is just massive. Then you have the
financials that have to be maintained, tuition
records, and everything else. It’s an immense
amount of information that’s required. I will never
fault them in protecting that knowledge. I’m not
saying don’t ever question, but when it comes to
things like this, if you have a problem with this,
why are you working here? We keep our
information more secure than the government
does, and I’m happy with that. (Office manager)
In summary, we found that the attitude of IT
Knows Best professionals toward ITsec measures is
very positive. They systematically uphold the
implemented security measures and perceive them
with high regard. On the surface, this might seem
obvious but as the previous sections demonstrated,
neither all IT professionals nor all users are equally
enthusiastic about IT security.

3.6 IT Security Disconnect
The IT Security Disconnect profile is comprised
of users who feel that even though a real security
breach could damage the university, they do not
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believe that a breach of their own account or the loss
of their own laptop constitutes a security breach.
They therefore do not consider it important to abide
by ITsec policies and may find the security measures
unnecessarily constraining. Their view of security
allows for a disconnect between their own IT security
habits and those prescribed by the university. One
program director and senior professor expressed his
views by saying:
I do not understand AT ALL why my laptop
needs to be encrypted. Even if someone stole my
laptop and even if that someone managed to guess
my password (both events are unlikely and their
simultaneous occurrence even more unlikely), I
do not believe that this breaches the university's
IT security. I do believe that a "real" breach of
security could hurt the university. I just do not
believe that a "real" breach can be effectuated
through my computer. (Senior professor and
director of a program)
Some professionals do not find that their use of
some systems is a security breach. One example of
this is from the university’s marketing department. A
marketing manager purchased and began using an
inexpensive analytics application in 2008. At the time
of its initial purchase, the application had been
approved by the IT department. Yet, subsequent to
the establishment of the CISO position and the strict
focus on security, the particular application was
disapproved for use in other departments. The
marketing department wanted to remain under the
radar in order to continue to use a now disallowed
system:
“Do we really need as much security as they’re
telling us we need? I don’t have details of that. I
try to stay under the radar with this program we
use so they don’t come after me, since it was
implemented with PHEI’s support, but
implemented before some of these extra security
layers have been added” (Director of a program).
Even the non-use of a security feature is regarded
as valid. After encryption was enforced on
institutionally provided mobile devices including
laptops (which dramatically increased the repair time
of the devices), some professionals abstained from
using PHEI’s laptops. One software analyst and
programmer told us: “Like one of the things that ITS
wants is if you have a laptop, your hard drive has to
be encrypted. That’s the rule, which is one of the
reasons why I don’t have an [institutionally provided]
laptop” (Senior IT analyst).

In summary, we found four main profiles
corresponding to two assumptions toward ITsec
measures. These profiles have different outcomes for
IT security behaviors. To this end, we dedicate the
remainder of our paper in the following section.

4. Outcomes of the Four Profiles
The four groups in our matrix respond differently
to security measures, even if they agree within their
group on the security perspective. We found that the
IT staff in the IT Security Overindulgence group
although often frustrated, are more cautious in their
assessments of IT intentions and are less prone to
circumvent IT policies than the Security
Overindulgence users. The latter group assumes that
the IT department wants control, an assumption that
we did not find in the interview texts of the IT client
services (or at least not openly expressed in words).
Furthermore, the security overindulgence users are
more prone to be circumventors of ITsec measures.
In the following table we briefly analyze the probable
outcomes of each profile vis a vis security measures
and we advance relevant propositions. Due to space
limitations, this section is briefed in Table 1 and the
quotations are limited to one quote per outcome.
More quotes and proofs may be made available upon
request by contacting the corresponding author.
Some existing ITsec theories seem to resonate
with and complement our theory (MSPP) in Figure 1
although our theory differs from the existing ones in
important areas. One of the most widely used theories
in studies of IT security and IT security policy
compliance is neutralization theory. Neutralization
theory [26] describes the psychological techniques
individuals use to justify socially undesirable
behavior. These include denial of responsibility,
denial of injury, denial of the victim, condemnation
of the condemners, appeal to higher loyalties, and the
metaphor of the ledger. Some of these techniques
might be employed by individuals fitting our IT
Overindulgence and IT Disconnect profiles.
However, the neutralization techniques are not based
on assumptions, but rather rationalizations. In the
case of neutralization, perpetrators are aware that
they are behaving poorly but rationalize their
behavior. Our analysis focuses on the underpinning
assumptions of individuals that then drive their
behavior. In the case of profiles, the individuals who
are not complying with IT security policies do not
believe that they are doing anything wrong. Hence, it
is not that they are rationalizing, or neutralizing, their
behavior; rather, based on their assumptions, they are
acting rationally. Another theory called Control
Reactance Compliance Model (CRCM) [15] has
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some similarities with MSPP as well as major
differences. CRCM introduces the notion of “threat
to freedom”, “reactance to ITsec policy” and
“proneness to reactance”. Reactance is the negative
emotional response (i.e. anger, frustration…) that is
caused by the loss or threat of loss of
behavioral/decisional freedom. CRCM finds that the
threat to freedom and the proneness to reactance both
positively influence the reactance, which ultimately
negatively impacts the intention to compliance with
the new ITsec measure. Although our profiles IT
Security Overindulgence and IT Security Disconnect
profiles share outcomes with the Reactance construct
in CRCM, MSPP focuses on individuals’ perceptions
of IT security itself rather than on how IT security
impedes, or promotes, their behavioral freedom. We
maintain that in order to influence individuals’ longterm IT security behaviors, IT departments must
shape individuals’ assumptions about security and
not focus exclusively on the outcomes of their IT
security behaviors. Finally, security literature
profiling compliant and non-compliant employees
focuses only on their motivations (malicious vs. nonmalicious) [28], their intentional vs. unintentional
noncompliance [4] and their level of technology
expertise [1]. Our paper moves away from these
dimesions to analyze the working assumptions and
backgrounds of compliant and non-compliant
employees.

5. Limitations,
Conclusion

Contributions

and

As with any research, ours is not without
limitations. First, we conducted this research at one
site. Some may argue that the validity of one site is
questionable. Nevertheless, Sarker et al., [22]
analyzed 98 qualitative articles and found that 52%
of them used one case-based research. Indeed, case
study methodologists have been asserting that one
case-based studies are adequate [13]. Second, the
results are drawn from one industry type, namely,
education. This issue, it may be argued, limits the
generalizability of the findings. It is true that limited
generalizability is a threat to any qualitative research;
nevertheless, we can prove that the educational site
where this paper chose to conduct the research is a
good proxy of other industries, particularly in terms
of security breaches and research. Universities are the
second most targeted sector (on a par with the retail
sector) attacked by hackers after the healthcare
sector. In 2014, 37% of reported security breaches
involved the healthcare sector, and 11% and 10% of
all the security breaches were related to the retail and
educational sectors, respectively, as reported by

Symantec and NBC news [27]. In 2015 alone, three
major high profile security breaches hit Penn State
University, the University of Connecticut, and the
University of Virginia [27]. We believe the current
reality of security breaches in the world, makes PHEI
a relevant and credible proxy to other industries.
We conducted a grounded theory approach
interviewing employees in a higher education
organization and exploring their views on security
measures applied in their institution. This study
makes several important contributions. Our research
extends the IT security literature investigating nonmalicious security violators by looking at IT
employees themselves as potential non-malicious
violators. Most of the extant work treats IT
employees as potential malicious violators because
their expertise would seem to make it unlikely that
they would inadvertently violate security policies.
However, we uncover the possibility that IT
employees can also be non-malicious violators.
Future research should examine IT employees who
are not necessarily disgruntled with their jobs or their
organizations, but are ironically disgruntled with IT
security itself. Second, this study revealed the
underlying
assumptions
of
employees
in
organizations regarding ITsec measures. The extant
literature seldom touches on the assumptions of
different groups concerning ITsec measures. Previous
studies generally describe the antecedents of
employee security behavior intentions. Our research
examines the assumptions behind the antecedents of
employee security behavior. Furthermore, future
research
is
needed
to
incorporate
IT
expertise/knowledge into the MSPP matrix and to
control for it among the profiles. The preliminary
findings in MSPP shows that there are no differences
among the IT Security Disconnect and IT Security
Overindulgence vis a vis IT expertise, since in both
groups we found both users and IT staff who
expressed the above mentioned assumptions in the
analysis section.
On the managerial level, this study challenges the
dominant assumption of IT security and IT security
policy compliance research that security and security
compliance are de facto positive and good for
organizations. We do not question the need for IT
security, but our results do suggest that more security
is not necessarily better security and that sometimes,
in seeking to make oneself more secure,
organizations inadvertently alienate high performing
employees. The data suggests that there can be
adverse effects to increased security measures on user
satisfaction with the IT department and on security
itself, especially in cases where users feel that the
security measures are unaccompanied by adequate
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explanation and justification from the IT department
toward the users (and other IT staff), thereby
reinforcing their assumption of IT security
overindulgence. The research on the downsides of
ITsec measures is still young and evolving. We hope

future researchers will extend and test the MSPP
matrix with a view towards developing a stream of
research that explicates the mixed and often
contradictory feelings toward ITsec measures.

Table 1: Profiles, Outcomes and Propositions
Profile 
Quote  Proposition
Outcome
IT Knows Best (IT
staff)  Security
Enforcing

“Most of our updates [on systems] are pushed out via a couple of different methods. So, most of them
are pushed out. Despite the fact that they’re pushed out, we try to educate the users and make sure they
know to check for updates, make sure their machine is updated and that sort of thing. But that’s easier
said than done, getting them to actually do that, which is why we try to be pretty proactive about
pushing out updates (Software support specialist).”
Proposition 1: IT Knows Best IT staff will be more prone to enforce ITsec measures than to explain
and justify a priori why they are enforced.

IT Security
Overindulgence (IT
staff)  Frustrated
but Staying
Cautious

“PHEI - IT security department has set the bar quite high, and I don’t necessarily fault them for that,
but I do think that it’s a case where, because of their decision to set that bar high, you could argue it
restricts certain business functions or business opportunities for the school. I guess I want to be careful
that I’m not saying it’s necessarily... it’s not unnecessary, but because the expectation, the threshold has
been set so high for security that it is restrictive to business process for us as a school (Director of a
computer center).
Proposition 2: IT Security Overindulgence IT members will be less prone than users to fault the ITsec
measures and are less prone than non-IT users to circumvent ITsec policies.

IT Security
Overindulgence
(users) and IT
Security Disconnect
 Circumventing
and/or
Openly
Frustrated

“I think they go overboard on security. That’s another thing. We didn’t have any problems using our
software, but that was before. I’ve been using it since 2008. I know another department is trying to add
the same software we’re using, and PHEI is giving them fits. I got lucky. Security, they go above and
beyond. (Res. 30)”
In the words of a program director, “So yeah, my own feeling is some security they do because they
feel like they need to do it to demonstrate that it’s state of the art security, even without reflecting on
who it’s helping and what problem it’s solving.” (Senior professor)
Proposition 3: Security measures without sufficient justification in the eyes of the users increase nonmalicious volitional security violations.
Proposition 4: In the absence of circumvention opportunities, security measures without sufficient
justification in the eyes of the users increase user frustration with the IT department.

IT Knows Best
(users)
Cheerleading

“You hear about all of these security breaches [in government], and hacks, and everything else. The
one thing I would say is that you very rarely hear of a university ever having to disclose that there has
been a breach of their information. If you consider all the financial records that are held by the
universities, if they can protect it, why can’t you [government]? Do you know what I mean? I would
say universities have a model in place that would probably benefit some government areas (Office
manager)”
Proposition 5: Users who have worked in a security-related firm in the past will encourage increases of
IT security measures.

IT Security
Indulgence 
Indifferently
complying

“I would assume that somewhere in the email is something about why and how important the VPN
double authentication is, but I also assume that most of us don’t read our email that in detail, and we
also skim websites where we’re picking up instructions on how to do the process we have to do, so we
probably don’t explicitly process that message, but I think it’s there, but I’m assuming that.” (Faculty)
Proposition 6: Users related to routine and administrative jobs will be more prone to comply with IT
security measures than high activity non-administrative users.
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